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Elise C. Boddie∗
INTRODUCTION
Although it is the dominant paradigm in equal protection, 1 colorblind individualism bears little resemblance to the lived experiences
2
Within the colorblind individualist framework, raceof race.
conscious selection policies presumptively violate equal protection
3
because they place the racial group above the individual. And yet, a
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For their comments and insights on earlier versions of this Article, I am grateful to
Michelle Adams, Devon Carbado, Rachel Godsil, and Robin Lenhardt. I also thank Linda
Tropp for her research suggestions, in addition to the editorial staff of the University of
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law and my research assistant, Cliff Dawkins. In
the interest of disclosure, I participated in drafting an amicus brief in the Supreme Court
that was filed in support of the University of Texas in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.
That brief advances some of the issues raised in this Article.
See Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative Action, 82
B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (2002) (“It is now abundantly clear that a majority of the current
Supreme Court views the Equal Protection Clause as a font of individual rights protection
rather than as a safeguard for minority group interests.”); Tracy E. Higgins & Laura A.
Rosenbury, Agency, Equality, and Antidiscrimination Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1194, 1198
(2000) (“[T]he central principles that characterize [colorblind individualist] discourse
include the notions that individuals, and not groups, are the primary political units and
bearers of rights . . . .”). See also Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term—Foreword:
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4, 6 (1977) (contending that equal protection “presumptively guarantees to each individual the right to be
treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating member”
and, therefore, “presumptively forbids the organized society to treat an individual either
as a member of an inferior or dependent caste or as a nonparticipant”); cf. Lani Guinier,
Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of Emperor’s Clothes, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 1589 (1993) (discussing the liberal individualist critique of race-conscious voting legislation on the grounds that it emphasized the group above individual rights).
See generally Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77 (2000) (exploring the
role that “color blindness discourse” plays in legitimating and rationalizing racial stratification).
Higgins & Rosenbury, supra note 1, at 1198; Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 730 (2007) (observing that “[a]t the heart of the Constitution’s
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substantial body of social science points to the importance of racial
minority groups for cultivating the “individuality” of the persons who
4
comprise them. This research shows, for instance, that having a
meaningful number of racial minorities in institutional settings can
affect the likelihood that minorities in those institutions will perceive
5
themselves, and be perceived by others, in individual terms.
This Article explores this connection between individuality—what
I define here as the personal expression and growth that occurs in an
6
environment free of tokenism, racial stereotypes, and stigma —and
the environmental presence of other people of color. Contrary to
the normative assumptions that underlie colorblind individualism in
equal protection, using racial classifications as a tool for building ra7
cial groups in institutions can reduce the salience of race. Having a
minority group presence creates a social context in which persons of

4

5
6

7

guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat
citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national
class” (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995))) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“Because the
Fourteenth Amendment ‘protect[s] persons, not groups,’ all ‘governmental action based
on race—a group classification long recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and
therefore prohibited—should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the
personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed.’” (quoting Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995))); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (questioning “judicial protection against classifications based
upon . . . racial or ethnic background because such distinctions impinge upon personal
rights, rather than the individual only because of his membership in a particular group”).
See Jay Rothman & Michal Albertstein, Individuals, Groups and Intergroups: Theorizing About
the Role of Identity in Conflict and its Creative Engagement, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 631,
641 (2013) (“When outside forces, such as culture and community, have the most powerful shaping influence on an individual’s identity, then its social quality provides the most
relevant perspective.”); Linda R. Tropp et al., The Use of Research in the Seattle and Jefferson County Desegregation Cases: Connecting Social Science and the Law, 7 ANALYSES SOC.
ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 93, 101 (2007) (“Members of racial minority groups, who have long
been subjected to racial stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination, are likely to encounter negative effects of racial categorization in their everyday lives.”); Lu-in Wang, Race as
Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 1067 (2004)
(“Interactions in a range of such settings in which racial discrimination is a perpetual
concern—such as employment, health care, and the criminal justice system—tend to be
characterized by the presence of factors that promote behavioral confirmation and the
absence of factors that might disrupt the process.”).
See infra Part II.
This definition tracks the Court’s interpretation of the equal protection guarantee in cases adjudicating the constitutionality of racial classifications in affirmative action. See, e.g.,
City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989) (reaffirming that the purpose
of equal protection is to avoid use of racial classifications that convey racial prejudice, stereotypes and stigma); cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (identifying tokenism as one harm of low
minority representation, which leads minorities to function as “spokespersons for their
race”).
See infra Part II.
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color are more likely to view themselves, and to be viewed by others,
in terms that move beyond racial categories, consistent with equal
8
For racial minorities, therefore,
protection’s normative goals.
achieving equal protection’s “colorblind” notions of individuality
paradoxically depends on a racial predicate—that institutions raceconsciously seek to enroll racial groups that are large enough to min9
imize the significance of race.
This Article unpacks this paradox in the context of efforts to
achieve a meaningful presence of underrepresented racial minority
groups—referred to here as “critical mass”—in institutions of higher
10
education. Higher education is a natural focus for this discussion
because of the acknowledged role that critical mass plays in securing
11
the educational benefits of diversity and because higher education is
12
the site for continuing disputes about its constitutionality. Tracking
Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion in Regents of the University of California v.
13
Bakke, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in Grutter v. Bollinger acknowledged the role that critical mass could play in enriching the educa14
tional environment in colleges and universities. Yet in the recent
case of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, the concept of critical
15
mass has come under attack. Although the Supreme Court in Fisher
endorsed diversity as a compelling state interest for purposes of high16
er education, the Court scarcely mentioned “critical mass” in its
17
opinion, suggesting that the concept’s future may be uncertain.
Thus, this Article builds on emerging scholarship on critical
18
mass by contesting the commonly presumed tension between indi-
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See infra Part II.
See infra Parts II & III.A.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333–35 (2003).
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
539 U.S. 306, 329–31 (2003).
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
Id. at 2418 (“The attainment of a diverse student body . . . serves values beyond race
alone, including enhanced classroom dialogue and the lessening of racial isolation and
stereotypes.”).
Id.
See, e.g., Adeno Addis, The Concept of Critical Mass in Legal Discourse, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
97, 133–34 (2007) (observing that the creation of “critical mass” depends on empirical
observation of the student body and the students’ interactions in a unique institutional
context); Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1130, 1134 (2013)
(discussing how a focus on intraracial diversity—namely, diversity focusing on the interests and types of individuals within a diverse group—may be succesfully used in the admission process and considering the potential consequences); Vinay Harpalani, Diversity
Within Racial Groups and the Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions, 15 U. PA. J.

784

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17:3

vidualism and groupism. 19 At bottom, my point is that our constitutional analysis need not always choose between the two: the former
often depends on the presence of the latter and particularly so in the
20
context of race. Moreover, acknowledging the areas of overlap between individual—and group—identity creates opportunities to advance narratives that situate race-conscious objectives within the con21
ventional equal protection framework.
Part I discusses colorblind individualism as the dominant paradigm in equal protection, and the (wrongly) presumed tension within this framework between individual rights and racial classifications
22
that by definition rely on group categorizations. This Part lays the
foundation for understanding how holistic university admissions policies that strive to create critical mass and intraracial diversity satisfy
23
equal protection’s normative concerns.
Part II explores social science findings that erode the doctrinal
basis for equal protection’s presumed conflict between individual
rights and the use of race to achieve critical mass. This Part contends
that blindness both to racial groups and to the diversity within those
groups paradoxically perpetuates the very stereotypes that equal protection condemns and can increase—rather than diminish—the salience of race.
Part III explains how efforts to achieve critical mass through raceconscious admissions in higher education can be reconciled with the
objectives of colorblind individualism by alleviating the salience of
race for individuals. Part III.A begins by describing the origins of
critical mass in Grutter and the dispute over critical mass more recently in Fisher.

19

20

21
22

23

CONST. L. 463, 467 (2012) (contending “that diversity within racial groups is key to understanding the constitutionality of race-cosncious admission policies”).
See, e.g., William Bradford Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown,
93 YALE L.J. 995, 1001 (1984) (identifying conflict between individualism and racial
group orientation).
See John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the Rhetoric
Against Affirmative Action, 79 IOWA L. REV. 313, 325 (1994) (“[R]elating to persons without
regard to social relationships requires ignoring a significant part of their life and experience that makes them unique.”).
Cf. Harpalani, supra note 18, at 466–71 (reconciling the group concept of “critical mass”
under equal protection doctrine).
Legal scholars have long explored the distinction in equal protection between individuals
and groups. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 1, at 1100–09 (discussing the role of group identity in the formation of individual identity and behavior); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976) (urging a more robust
acknowledgement of groups in equal protection in order to take “fuller account of social
reality”).
See infra Part III.
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Part III.B turns to the particular dimensions of critical mass. Here
I contend that critical mass can be conceived both in terms of the size
of the minority student body as well as the kind of diversity within un24
derrepresented racial minority groups or “intraracial diversity.” Because intraracial diversity depends on individual variation among
persons of color, it aligns with equal protection’s normative emphasis
25
on individuality. To illustrate this point, Part III discusses equal protection cases that reject stereotypical presumptions of the “sameness”
of racial minorities. These cases articulate norms of intraracial differentiation that support the constitutional premise of intraracial diversity.
In Part III.C, I contend that requiring the state to ignore race—in
a context in which it has structured the lives of individual applicants—may paradoxically violate the principles of colorblind individualism. I conclude with some thoughts about how to operationalize
critical mass through intraracial diversity and what it means for equal
protection.
I. COLORBLIND INDIVIDUALISM IN EQUAL PROTECTION
Equal protection presumptively rejects the use of race as a criteri26
The reasons for this stem
on for government selection policies.
from principles of colorblind individualism, which hold that the individual—rather than the racial group to which she belongs—is the
27
“primary political unit[] and bearer[] of rights.” The assumption is
24

25

26

27

See I. Bennett Capers, Flags, 48 HOW. L.J. 121, 122 (2004) (“[C]ritical mass is not solely
numerical. Rather, a critical mass implies a climate where one is neither conspicuous nor
on display, where one does not feel the opprobrium of being a token, nor the burden of
being the designated representative for an entire group.”); Carbado, supra note 18, at
1133–34 (observing the same, but raising concerns about the potential for racial typecasting); Harpalani, supra note 18, at 468 (noting quantitative and qualitative aspects of critical mass); Sheldon Bernard Lyke, Catch Twenty-Wu? The Oral Argument in Fisher v. University of Texas and the Obfuscation of Critical Mass, 107 NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 209, 216
(2013) (arguing that critical mass “has both quantitative and qualitative elements”).
See Elise Boddie, Commentary on Fisher: The Importance of Diversity Within Diversity,
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 11, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/comme
ntary-on-fisher-the-importance-of-diversity-within-diversity (“These students advance the
University’s educational mission by helping to defeat racial stereotypes that all minorities
have experiences and perspectives that are functionally indistinguishable.”).
See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to
race-conscious affirmative action); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279–80
(1986) (applying strict scrutiny in reviewing the constitutionality of a provision in a collective bargaining agreement for race-based protection against layoffs); Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (concluding that strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications).
See Higgins & Rosenbury, supra note 1, at 1198.
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that using racial groups as an organizing principle for government
policy leads to racial stereotypes and stigmatizes individuals on the
28
basis of race. Such express considerations of race are further presumed to lead to racial balkanization, characterized by separateness
29
30
and discord that distracts us from our shared individuality.
As conceived by the colorblind individualist, “equality” is a thin,
formalistic concept that regards the relative disadvantage and opportunity differences between racial groups as largely irrelevant to equal
31
protection. What matters instead is the state’s racially even-handed
treatment of individuals as they pursue their respective visions of the
32
good life. A central component of colorblind individualism is that
the state “remain neutral among competing conceptions” of the good
33
and not privilege any particular vision above another. Within this
framework, individuals are presumed to be “fully self-determining,
34
freely choosing subject[s].” The differences among individuals that
invariably result from this unfettered choice are to be competitively
35
resolved in the private sphere, without interference by the state.
Because the state is supposed to be agnostic about racial differ36
ences, race is deemed to be “irrelevant to the public self.” From this
vantage point, race-conscious selection policies are constitutionally
problematic because they require the state to referee contests among
37
individuals on the basis of race. Conversely, the state’s “colorblind”
refusal to take race into account in government decisionmaking
28

29

30

31
32
33
34
35
36
37

See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (observing that
“[c]lassifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm”); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298
(noting that preferential programs based on race “reinforce common stereotypes holding
that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based on a
factor having no relation to individual worth”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See generally Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011) (observing that equal protection’s
presumptive rejection of racial classifications reflects the Court’s concern about their impact on “social cohesion”).
Id. at 1300 (“In prohibiting race-based civil rights initiatives, race conservatives are conventionally understood as reasoning from the anticlassification principle concerned with
threats to individualism, while race progressives who uphold affirmative action and other
race-conscious civil rights initiatives are understood to reason about equality with attention to subordination or group status.”); see also Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection,
124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011) (discussing the balkanization critique as a form of “pluralism anxiety” that has transformed equal protection).
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310.
See Higgins & Rosenbury, supra note 1, at 1197–1204.
Id. at 1198.
Id.
Id. at 1199.
Id.
Id. at 1199–1200.
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aligns with equal protection’s normative goals. 38 Under the colorblindness rubric, individuals compete against one another based on
their personal characteristics and experiences, including the purportedly “race-neutral” advantages and disadvantages that they have
39
accumulated in the private sphere.
The primacy of the individual and the resulting conception of
state neutrality help to explain the Supreme Court’s low tolerance for
group-based distinctions in equal protection. For instance, the Court
has long rejected the cognizability of equal protection claims that are
40
based solely on disproportionate adverse racial impact, and instead
41
This
requires proof of discriminatory treatment against persons.
view presumes the irrelevance of racialized group disadvantage as a
constitutional matter and emphasizes the importance of the individual to equal protection.
The same normative assumptions that have led the Court to reject
group inequality as an equal protection concern also animate its view
that all racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny, even if they are intended to help racially disadvantaged groups overcome pervasive dis42
crimination. From the colorblind individualist perspective, whether
a government program is designed to benefit or to burden persons of
color is immaterial because equal protection should not permit the
43
state to take account of differences among racial groups. Thus, the
level of scrutiny under equal protection does not depend on a particular racial group’s status: Any state consideration of race is subject to
44
rigorous judicial review.
Here I turn to a key premise of colorblind individualism, which is
that colorblind decisionmaking can in fact disassociate “the individu45
al” from her racial “group.” As Professor Reva Siegel has observed,
this assumption depends in turn on the formalistic premise that “race
is socially and morally irrelevant, a matter of appearance or skin color
46
only.”

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Higgins & Rosenbury, supra note 1, at 1199–1200.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (rejecting “racially disproportionate
impact” as an equal protection violation unto itself).
See id.
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989).
See, e.g., id. at 493–94; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1995);
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978).
See J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493–94; Pena, 515 U.S. at 222; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291.
See J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493–94; Pena, 515 U.S. at 222; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291.
See Morrison, supra note 20, at 324–30 (critiquing this view).
See Siegel, supra note 2, at 88.
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To unpack this further, let’s consider an admissions process at a
selective public university. As just discussed, under the colorblind individualist framework, the university would be prohibited from explicitly factoring race into admissions decisions. We might imagine
that it selects individuals instead based on their academic records, extracurricular activities, and teacher recommendations. But no judgment could be made about how that particular individual might “fit”
into the overall racial composition of entering first year students.
Within this paradigm, race makes no difference because it is pre47
sumed to be immaterial to the public self.
The mistake here lies in the premise that the state’s selection pro48
cess is actually “free” of race. Although the state does not explicitly
rely on race in choosing among individual applicants, the effects of its
“colorblindness” are hardly race-neutral. Understanding this point
requires some exploration of social science, which identifies a symbiotic relationship between the presence of racial minority groups and
the development and expression of individuality for persons of col49
or. Without a critical mass of other people of color, racial minorities are more likely to experience racial tokenism, stereotypes, and
50
stigma. This racial dynamic undermines their ability to develop a
51
sense of themselves beyond the context of being the racial “other.”
The resulting oppositional identity—which is borne from an experience of racial isolation and racial salience—inhibits the emergence of
52
The
an individual identity that is less fully dependent on race.
state’s refusal on the front end to take account of race for purposes of
building critical mass, in other words, has racial repercussions on the
back end for the individualism of minority students in the university
53
environment.

47

48

49
50
51
52
53

See Higgins & Rosenbury, supra note 1, at 1199 (“The solution [to social differences] . . . is
accomplished by defining difference as irrelevant to the public self, the citizens, and relegating it to the private.”).
Formally excising race from the admissions process fails to account for the ways in which
race may unwittingly seep into an application—in part due to the difficulty that individual
applicants may have denying or ignoring the formative role that race played to their personal experiences and identity. See Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial
Preferences, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1139 (2008) (discussing the practical and theoretical challenges of racial “neutrality” in the admissions context).
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III. But see Deirdre M. Bowen, American Skin: Dispensing with Colorblindness
and Critical Mass in Affirmative Action, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 339, 375–77 (2011) (observing
the benefits of critical mass but contending that institutions of higher education are min-
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The consequences of this not only can be felt by individual persons of color, but also ripples across the institution itself. The diminished sense of belonging and security can erode the willingness of ra54
cial minorities to engage in university life. As discussed below, this
in turn undermines both the quantity and quality of interactions be55
tween white students and students of color. The result can be a selfperpetuating cycle of awkward, racialized encounters that limit the
appetite for future cross-racial interactions and/or leave both racial
minorities and whites in a state of perpetual estrangement and mutu56
al distrust.
The critical point here is that state institutions are complicit in
both the creation and maintenance of this racially compromised social architecture because colorblindness heightens social sensitivity to
and awareness of race. Thus, the state is not a neutral, racially impartial decisionmaker as the colorblind individualist paradigm assumes,
but rather is an instigator of racial mistrust and dysfunction. The
57
state’s efforts to deny race only make the problem worse.
As will be discussed in Part III, the Supreme Court acknowledged
the limits of colorblind individualism in Grutter, which embraced the
use of racial classifications for purposes of achieving critical mass in
58
order to realize the educational benefits of diversity. Critical mass
has come under attack recently, however, in Fisher. Before we turn to
Fisher though, we need to understand why having sufficient numbers
of racial minorities helps to foster social conditions that mitigate the
salience of race. The next Part explores the social science research
that underscores the importance of racial groups to individuality for
persons of color.

54

55
56
57

58

imally equipped to achieve the benefits of diversity, even with critical mass, where colorblindness discourse dominates).
See infra Part III. Deirdre Bowen observes the complexity of these dynamics and the potential for interactions among diverse groups of students—who “carry different vestiges of
status and power”—to run aground when they are not carefully managed. See Bowen, supra note 53, at 379–83.
See infra Part III.
See Bowen, supra note 53, at 379–83 (describing this dynamic).
Cf. Bowen, supra note 53, at 388 (“Colorblindness’s functionality as a way to minimize
conflict and discomfort actually does the opposite.”); see also Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant
Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J.
1197, 1199 (2010) [hereinafter Bowen, Brilliant Disguise] (“Underrepresented minority
students in states that permit affirmative action encounter far less hostility and internal
and external stigma than students in anti-affirmative action states.”).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336 (2003).
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II. WHY RACIAL GROUPS MATTER
This Part discusses social science research that explains the dynamic racial consequences of colorblind individualism. This research
erodes the important premise of colorblindness—that state action is
necessarily racially neutral when it explicitly excludes race from a selection process. In fact, the state’s blindness to race can produce the
very racial dynamics that equal protection purports to condemn by
heightening the racial salience and visibility of persons of color in the
subject institution. On the other hand, state actors can mitigate the
effects of racial difference by selectively taking race into account in a
way that builds critical mass, thereby reducing the institutional visibility of persons of color and the associated problems of tokenism, ste59
Properly understood, therefore, calibrated
reotype, and stigma.
race consciousness, rather than enforced race neutrality, is more
faithful to the objectives of equal protection. This Part examines social science research to document how the sensitive acknowledgement of racial groups can promote individuality and, conversely, how
the absence of sufficient diversity, including intraracial diversity, diminishes persons of color.
A. The Effects of Tokenism
Let’s return to our purportedly colorblind admissions process.
Assume that only 2% (or twenty) of the 1,000 students admitted to
the first year class of a selective public university are AfricanAmerican. The colorblind individualist views this as the happy con60
sequence of racial neutrality. From this perspective, because the
state has not inserted race into the admissions process, the individuality of the twenty black students was not compromised in any way:
they were evaluated and admitted based solely on “who they are” as
individuals, which is presumed to be wholly separate from their racial
group identity. Accordingly, the state has not stereotyped or stigmatized these students by using race as a factor in the selection process
59

60

Achieving these educational benefits also requires universities to take account of a status
and power dynamic among racial groups that moves beyond the numbers. Bowen, supra
note 53, at 384–85 (observing that numbers alone “do not equate to social standing”).
Bowen argues that such an outcome cannot be achieved through diversity if colorblindness is the dominant paradigm. Id. at 387–88 (“[D]iversity in a colorblind society creates
invisibility . . . . It creates a schizophrenic environment in which race is consumed for education but otherwise ignored.”).
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349–50 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (contending that underrepresented minorities would be better off if they were denied admission to elite law schools than if
they were admitted under race-conscious selection policies).
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and, therefore, it has preserved its role as a racially-neutral arbiter of
individual merit.
Closer inspection of the racial dynamic that unfolds as a result of
this admissions process, however, yields different insights. It reveals
that a number of the African-American students who were admitted
declined to attend the “colorblind” institution, and chose instead to
matriculate at another selective university that had a larger black
61
population. It also shows that the students who did choose to attend
feel racially isolated and alienated from their environment as a consequence of their low numbers and the resulting high visibility of
their race in their classrooms, their dorms, and in other social and
62
academic spaces. These black students come to perceive themselves
and are perceived by others as “the representative” of “the” African63
American experience. As a result, they suffer the harms of tokenism
and the very racial stereotypes and stigma that they were supposedly
64
spared under the “race neutral” admissions policy.
Research on gender tokenism suggests that low minority representation not only affects students of color, but can also lead to a range
65
of negative downstream consequences for the institution as a whole.
Underrepresentation fosters divisions between racial “ingroups” and
“outgroups” and leads individuals within each group to reciprocally
66
stereotype and “otherize” persons on the basis of racial difference.
61
62
63

64
65

66

See William C. Kidder, Misshaping the River: Proposition 209 and Lessons for the Fisher Case,
39 J.C. & U.L. 53, 56 (2013).
Id. at 58.
See Bowen, Brilliant Disguise, supra note 57, at 1234 (describing heightened stigma and
racial isolation among minority students in anti-affirmative action states and the “open
hostility” they face “[d]espite being admitted on purely white, normative admissions
standards”).
Id.
See Eden B. King et al., Understanding Tokenism: Antecedents and Consquences of a Psychological Climate of Gender Inequity, 19 J. MGMT. 482, 484 (2010) (noting consequences of tokenism in the context of work). Cf. Mischa Thompson & Denise Sekaquaptewa, When Being
Different is Detrimental: Solo Status and the Performance of Women and Racial Minorities, 2
ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 183, 185–93 (2002) (discussing the negative impact of
“solo status” on performance outcomes and observing that racial minorities’ “solo status”
can lead to “overly cautious” styles of communication).
See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations after Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1275 (1998) (“Taken as a whole, research in social identity
suggests that reducing the salience of intergroup boundaries can reduce intergroup bias,
while increasing category salience can exacerbate it.”). Professor Krieger observes that
although racial preferences can exacerbate discrimination against racial outgroups, id. at
1274–75, affirmative action can improve intergroup relations where it creates opportunities for students to develop multiple, “cross-cutting” identities. See id. at 1275–76 (observing that where “structures provide opportunities for recategorizing members of otherwise
distinct social groups. . . . [the] multiplication of potential categorical structures renders
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Predictably, this increases intergroup anxiety, which itself leads to
67
hostile or distrustful cross-racial interactions. Simply put, the failure
to create racially inclusive and diverse environments is more likely to
increase, rather than minimize, the significance of race. Preserving
the individuality of racial minorities thus first requires attention to
their status as a group.
To appreciate these points more fully, we start with a basic observation about the important constitutive role that racial group identity
68
plays in the formation of individual identity. Henri Tajfel’s early
work on social identity theorized that group membership is a fundamental component of an individual’s self-knowledge and awareness
and that such membership carries “emotional value and signifi69
cance.” Social groups “fulfill a fundamental human need for social
connectedness and serve as a primary source of individuals’ self per70
ceptions.” Individuals both conceive of themselves as members of a
71
group and seek to attribute positive characteristics to themselves as a
72
result of their group affiliation.

67

68

69
70
71

72

each less significant and thus less influential in intergroup perception, judgment, and
behavior”).
See Frances E. Frey & Linda R. Tropp, Being Seen as Individuals Versus As Group Members:
Extending Research on Metaperception to Intergroup Contexts, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
REV. 265, 272–73 (2006) (stating that intergroup anxiety exists where people feel “threatened and uncomfortable” and concerned that others hold racially negative perceptions
of them); see also Phillip A. Goff et al., The Space Between Us: Stereotype Threat and Distance in
Interracial Contexts, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 91, 104 (2008) (discussing the role
that the fear of appearing racist plays in heightening white anxiety in interactions with
blacks, leading whites to “physically distance themselves” from blacks when they encounter a “racially contentious topic” in conversation).
See, e.g., Rothman & Alberstein, supra note 4, at 640 (“This self-perception assumes individuality, but even in its uniqueness, the self is seen as incorporating the larger context
and existing in relationship with the other.”).
HENRI TAJFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES 255 (1981).
See King et al., supra note 65, at 488 (“Social identity theory . . . suggests that individuals
associate with others who are similar to them along meaningful dimensions . . . .”).
This does not mean that individuals necessarily see themselves solely in racial group terms.
See TAJFEL, supra note 69. Nor does this dynamic necessarily affect every person in the
,
same way. Rather, it describes a generalizable principle that challenges the default paradigm of colorblindness in equal protection. My point here is that empirical research suggests that this default is the wrong one, particularly given the goals of individualism that
underwrite the constitutional regime.
This racial self-conception is not necessarily internally consistent or uniform. See Kenneth
L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43
UCLA L. REV. 263, 284 (1995) (“This ‘white’ identity requires its bearers to suppress ‘the
blackness within’ . . . .”).
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Group identification and sorting is both a conscious and uncon73
scious human response. Indeed, “merely perceiving group distinctions can propel biased evaluations, even in the absence of overt con74
Through cognitive processes
flicts or structural inequalities.”
individuals divide themselves and others into favored “ingroups” and
75
disfavored “outgroups.” Ingroups can “powerfully enhance an indi76
Outgroups, on the
vidual’s self-evaluation and self-conception.”
77
other hand, are “homogenized, distanced and stereotyped.”
Racial group identification and sorting, therefore, are part of the
human condition. But these dynamics are exacerbated where racial
78
minorities are underrepresented. Research on the effects of tokenism in the gender context is instructive. For example, Rosabeth Moss
Kanter’s seminal studies on women in senior management positions
revealed that tokenism enhanced perceived gender differences between men and women, creating greater social distance between the
79
two groups. As a result, women felt pressured to conform to gender
80
81
stereotypes and more “scrutinized,” were more distressed and alienated from their work environments, and tended to operate within

73

74
75

76
77
78

79
80
81

See generally Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241 (2002) (explaining the role of stereotypes and unconscious biases in shaping perceptions of different racial groups); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing
Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 469 (2010) (explaining that social cognitions can be both implicit and explicit).
Tropp et al., supra note 4, at 101–02.
See Michael A. Hogg, Intragroup Processes, Group Structure and Social Identity, in SOCIAL
GROUPS AND IDENTITIES: DEVELOPING THE LEGACY OF HENRI TAJFEL 67 (W. Peter Robinson ed., 1996).
Adams, supra note 1, at 1102.
Id. at 1101.
See King et al., supra note 65, at 488 (“[M]embers of social identity groups attend to their
identities and relevant experiences, particularly in contexts in which their identities are
salient.”). Although the findings are not uniform, research indicates that persons of color are more likely to experience racial discrimination where there is low minority representation. This suggests that underrepresentation may also influence whites’ perception
and treatment of racial minorities. Id. at 485 (“Empirical evidence also demonstrates
that women and ethnic minorities are more likely to experience discrimination in contexts where they are underrepresented than in contexts that are more balanced.”). With
respect to gender, some research indicates that “social status, occupational deviance, and
job prestige” may also influence “tokenism dynamics.” Id. at 486; cf. Valerie PurdieVaughns et al., Social Identity Contingencies: How Diversity Cues Signal Threat or Safety for African Americans in Mainstream Institutions, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 615, 616
(2008) (hypothesizing how environmental “cues” can trigger different racialized perceptions, including distrust and identity threat).
King et al., supra note 65, at 484.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 492.
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a psychological schema that amplified the importance of gender. 82
83
These cumulative stressors “stifled emotional expression” and left
84
women less likely to strive to “fit” into their organizations.
The same dynamics operate in the context of race. For example,
a study of racial perceptions of a corporate environment showed that
having less employee diversity reduced African Americans’ level of
trust toward “colorblind” policies which were intended to convey that
85
Conversely,
race was “immaterial” to their institutional success.
where minority representation was high, African-American professionals “trusted the setting regardless of the stated diversity philoso86
In racially diverse environments, African Americans were
phy.”
more likely to regard a company’s professed colorblindness goals as
87
benign and to feel a sense of comfort and belonging. Similarly,
numerous studies confirm that the “solo status” of racial minorities—
in which they are “the only representative of [their] social category”—weakens their performance along a range of indicators, even
88
controlling for racial discrimination. Racial minorities in these con89
texts are likely to be perceived, and to perceive themselves, as racial
tokens, which makes them the subject of unwanted attention and
90
scrutiny that in turn dampens their success.
82

83
84
85

86

87
88

89

90

Id. at 488 (“[A] woman whose gender identity is salient may be particularly attuned to
dynamics she encounters that do not reflect positively on women; to the extent that women are tokens, gender-related issues will become salient and the organization will be perceived through a gender-focused schema.”).
Id. at 484.
King et al., supra note 65, at 498, 503.
See Purdie-Vaughns et al., supra note 78, at 621 (finding that when minority representation was low, minority individuals were more likely to distrust the colorblind policy); see
also Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 268 (“By virtue of being in the numerical minority,
people sense that they are subjected to greater scrutiny as representatives of their groups,
which contributes to a heightened awareness of group membership.” (internal citations
omitted)).
See Purdie-Vaughns et al., supra note 78, at 621 (“When minority group representation
was high, participants trusted the setting regardless of whether the stated diversity philosophy was colorblind or valuing diversity . . . .”).
Id.
See generally Thompson & Sekaquaptewa, supra note 65, at 186 (“This suggests that something in the situational context impedes the expression of knowledge and skills in performance for disadvantaged-group solos.”).
In group salient situations, people tend to stereotype both outgroups and their own
ingroups. They presume that ingroup members are more similar to them and that
outgroup members are more different. See Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 270 (discussing how people in group salient situations make “assumptions of ingroup similarity and
outgroup dissimilarity”).
See Thompson & Sekaquaptewa, supra note 65, at 185–86 (“[M]embers of disadvantaged
groups working in White male-dominated environments report feeling isolated, receiving
low responsibility positions and being showcased as representatives of their group . . . .
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Understanding these dynamics requires an appreciation of the relationship between the salience of racial groups and the size of those
groups. Low minority representation increases the salience of race
for racial minorities while high minority representation minimizes
91
it. This might make intuitive sense to anyone who has ever been in
a situation where her social identity was visibly underrepresented.
Women in an all-male environment are likely to be more cognizant of
92
their gender. A person with a disability may be more aware of her
physical limitations in a setting dominated by people who are not dis93
abled. Race works the same way. However, because the opportunity
94
for cross-racial interactions is generally low, the stakes that attend
these interactions in particular institutional settings are necessarily
higher and more consequential.
Thus, having fewer numbers of racial minorities heightens sensi95
tivity and awareness of racial difference. On the other hand, having
larger numbers tends to minimize the significance of race and to
96
promote a sense of individuality among minority populations. Ap-

91
92

93

94

95
96

Because many avenues to raises and promotions are based on informal networks, [minority] solos may be left out of the loop, damaging their opportunities for advancement.”
(internal citations omitted)).
See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text.
See generally Thompson & Sekaquaptewa, supra note 65, at 193 (“In addition to altering
one’s expectations about an upcoming task, solo status can also increase awareness of
one’s social identifications, i.e., racial and gender group memberships.”).
Research also suggests that the relative “salience” of people with disabilities in their environment may lead non-disabled people to misperceive the actual abilities of disabled persons. See Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social Cognition, and “Innocent Mistakes”,
55 VAND. L. REV. 481, 523 (2002).
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 963 (9th Cir.
2004) (“‘Racial and ethnic diversity is educationally important because, notwithstanding
decades of progress, there remain significant differences in our lives and perceptions that
are undeniably linked to the realities of race. Continuing patterns of residential segregation, for example, mean that the daily events and experiences that make up most Americans’ lives take place in strikingly homogenous settings. As a result, most students entering college have had few opportunities for meaningful interactions across lines of race
and ethnicity. This separation . . . provides little opportunity to disrupt racial stereotypes . . . .’” (citing Brief for Respondents at 11, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
(No. 02-516), reh’g granted en banc, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 551 U.S. 701
(2007)); see also Christopher Ingraham, Three Quarters of Whites Don’t Have Any Non-white
Friends, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs
/wonkblog/wp/2014/08/25/three-quarters-of-whites-dont-have-any-non-white-friends
(commenting on the average person’s tendency to have friends predominantly of the
same race).
See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text.
Id.; but see Bowen, Brilliant Disguise, supra note 57, at 1233–44 (describing the complexity
of interracial interactions and noting the importance of carefully managing them to
achieve the benefits of diversity); Bowen, supra note 53, at 375–77, 386–91 (observing the
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preciating this connection requires some additional understanding of
how people categorize themselves. Again, social science is instructive.
It indicates that the degree to which a person thinks of herself in individual or group terms depends on how she thinks that others per97
ceive her, otherwise known as “metaperceptions.” People perceive
themselves as individuals, or as racial group members, when they ex98
pect to be viewed as such by others. Critically, these individual and
99
group identities are “‘functional[ly] antagonist[ic].’” This means
that those who view themselves in individual terms are “less inclined
to think of themselves in terms of their group memberships; conversely, when people think of themselves as group members, they are
100
less likely to regard themselves as unique individuals.”
Colorblind individualists here assume that the use of racial classifications in government selection policies necessarily makes race
more consequential and leads people to think of themselves solely in
101
This view holds that relying on race to distinguish
racial terms.
among various applicants gives race significance and status that
should be unwarranted in a liberal democratic society which (at least
102
Indeed, intheoretically) judges people by their individual merit.
dividual Justices of the Supreme Court frequently contend as much
in opinions that condemn the use of race-conscious affirmative ac103
tion.
The problem with these arguments is that they rest on a basic
misunderstanding about the racial consequences of tokenism and the
importance of building critical mass in order to construct environments in which students of color feel freer to cultivate and to express
their individual identities. Studies indicate that whether one catego-

97

98
99
100
101

102
103

difficulty of achieving diversity’s educational benefits where “colorblindness” discourse
dominates the environment).
See Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 265, 268 (defining metaperceptions as an “interest in
what people think others think of them” and discussing factors that contribute to the degree to which “people expect to be viewed as individuals or as group members”).
Id. at 268.
Id. (quoting JOHN C. TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELFCATEGORIZATION THEORY 49 (1987)).
Id.
See Siegel, supra note 29, at 1287 (“[P]roponents of the anticlassification principle associate the rule against classifying by race with a value commonly associated with colorblindness claims: protecting individuals from the harm of categorization by race.”).
See Morrison, supra note 20, at 330–34.
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only
because those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives,
but also because every time the government . . . makes race relevant to the provision of
burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”).
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rizes herself in terms of her personal or group identity significantly
104
Once again, the level of midepends on the social environment.
nority representation in an institution is crucial: it affects whether
people “expect to be viewed as individuals” or as members of a racial
105
group. People are most likely to think of themselves in racial group
terms in tokenism contexts where the salience of racial groups is
106
high. On the other hand, in social situations where group salience
is low, individuals are more likely to “project their own views of them107
In other words, low racial salience improves
selves onto others.”
the chances that persons of color will perceive similarities between
108
themselves and individuals who comprise other racial groups, leading to a shared appreciation of common interests and experiences
across racial lines. Putting this all together, having greater minority
representation enhances the likelihood that individual persons of
color will focus on their similarities with individual whites, while low
representation leads them to dwell more on racial differences.
To understand this further, let’s assume for a moment that a white
student decides to attend an historically black college. Being in a
predominantly black environment, we might reasonably expect that
he would become more aware of being white and that this awareness
104

105
106

107
108

“Social identity theory” holds that identity operates on a personal and social level. “Personal identity” focuses “on one’s individuating attributes,” or the characteristics that are
distinct to people as individuals, while “social identity” focuses on “one’s group memberships.” Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 268. See also id. (discussing “social identity theory”
in the context of “self-categorization theory,” which “provid[es] a useful framework for
understanding how and why different levels of self-categorization might emerge in different social situations”).
See id. at 267 (“[S]ituational and individual factors . . . might influence whether people
expect to be viewed as individuals versus as group members.”).
Id. at 268 (“[W]hen group membership is salient, people are more likely to think of
themselves and others as group members, whereas when group membership is not salient, people are more likely [to] think of themselves and others as individuals.”); see also
Purdie-Vaughns et al., supra note 78, at 621 (discussing how low minority representation
triggered concerns among African Americans that they would be “devalued due to racial
identity”).
Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 269.
See id. at 269–70 (“[W]e expect that where there is an absence of cues to make group
membership salient in the social context, people should generally tend to project their
own views of themselves onto others. However, as group memberships become increasingly salient, we believe the bases of people’s metaperceptions should shift, such that they
begin to make predictions about others’ views in terms of the perceived values, characteristics, and attributes that define their groups.”). Research, however, indicates that the effects of tokenism are diminished for individual members of socially dominant groups. See
King et al., supra note 65, at 485–86 (discussing the results of sociological research “examining the experiences of underrepresented individuals,” which suggested that “some tokens do not face . . . difficulties,” including male nurses who did not report feeling “more
socially isolated than the women who dominated their occupation”).
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would be different in both kind and degree than if he were enrolled
109
instead at a predominantly white institution. We can also safely assume that he would be the subject of some curiosity as a white person
110
who stands out in a predominantly African-American environment.
He might even be stereotyped as a result of his whiteness, with some
111
questioning his motives for attending a majority-black school.
The point here is that the size of the racial minority group is a factor in the production of racial stereotypes—both in terms of how one
112
is viewed by his peers and in terms of how he views himself. Racial
stereotypes are particularly acute for racial minorities in environ113
ments where there are few persons of color. For instance, minority
faculty who teach at predominantly white institutions report that they
are frequently stereotyped “as having interests only in minority affairs,” which limits their exposure to other opportunities and damp114
As Claude Steele and others
ens their chances for advancement.
have persuasively demonstrated, concerns about being judged in accordance with prevailing stereotypes—commonly known as “stereo115
type threat”—undermines performance and achievement, a prob109

110

111

112

113

114
115

An interview of a white student who attended an historically black college discussed the
dynamics of being racially visible in a minority-serving institution. See Marybeth Gasman,
Being White at a Black College: An Interview, HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2012, 7:31 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marybeth-gasman/being-white-at-a-black-college_b_
1713729.html.
See id. (discussing the experience of being approached numerous times by students who
wanted to know how he “felt being at [a historically black college] as a white guy, why
[he] decided to attend, and what [he] thought about certain controversial topics related
to race”). But see Thompson & Sekaquaptewa, supra note 65, at 183–86 (noting that
“members of privileged groups, such as Whites and males” tend to be less “debilitated” by
their “solo status” in institutions).
See Gasman, supra note 109 (discussing queries from other students about why he would
choose to attend an historically black college and how it “felt being at a[] [Historically
Black College or University] as a white guy”).
Low institutional representation of persons of color can set a range of negative dynamics
in motion that “perpetuate our tendency to perceive outgroup members in stereotypical
terms.” Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 273. These “assumptions of ingroup similarity
and outgroup dissimilarity may also lead one to expect that one’s true characteristics will
be less transparent to outgroup members than to ingroup members.” Id. at 270.
See generally Thompson & Sekaquaptewa, supra note 65, at 184–85 (discussing studies finding weakened performance of racial minorities where they were “the only representative
of [their] social category” in a given group).
For a detailed discussion of these findings, see id. at 186.
See Joshua Aronson et al., Stereotype Threat and the Academic Underperformance of Minorities
and Women, in PREJUDICE: THE TARGET’S PERSPECTIVE, 83, 84–86 (Janet K. Swim &
Charles Stangor eds., 1998) (“The mere existence of such stereotypes poses for targets
the additional risk of being seen and treated stereotypically . . . . And, in situations where
the stakes are high, [this threat] may cause enough distress to interfere with their performance . . . of the activity.”); see also Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype
Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
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lem that is compounded where minorities are underrepresented. 116
Creating an environment in which race matters less on the backend,
therefore, requires institutions to develop a meaningful minority
presence on the front end.
B. The Anti-Balkanizing Benefits of Positive Intergroup Contact
Social science demonstrates the importance of positive intergroup
117
contact to reducing racial stereotypes and stigma. Gordon Allport’s
early “contact hypothesis” theorized that intergroup interactions between people from different racial backgrounds could reduce social
118
prejudice. His hypothesis has since evolved “into a full-blown theo119
ry of considerable complexity.” However, a significant body of work
validates Allport’s original findings that positive intergroup interactions alleviate anxiety and fear of other groups and increase social
120
empathy, which improves relations among groups.
That said, intergroup contact is not sufficient by itself to generate
positive cross-racial interactions. The simple presence of different
121
racial groups can heighten sensitivity to racial differences, because

116

117

118

119

120

121

PSYCHOL. 797, 807–10 (1995) (examining studies focusing on “stereotype threat”, which
showed that “making African American participants vulnerable to judgment by negative
stereotypes about their group’s intellectual ability depressed their standardized test performance . . . while conditions designed to alleviate this threat, improved their performance . . . .”).
See generally Thompson & Sekaquaptewa, supra note 65 (discussing various studies indicating that performance may suffer in situations where minorities find their group underrepresented).
Other factors contribute to the group salience of race. For example, the “mere presence
of an outgroup member,” conflict between racial groups, and stigmatized identity can increase the salience of race. See Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 268–69.
See Thomas F. Pettigrew et al., Recent Advances in Intergroup Contact Theory, 35 INT’L J.
INTERCULTURAL REL. 271, 272 (2011) (discussing recent advances in social psychology regarding intergroup contact, including Allport’s “contact hypothesis”).
Id. For a discussion of some of the nuances of the theory of positive “interracial contact
and its beneficial outcomes,” within the context of schoolchildren in integrated schools,
see generally Tropp et al., supra note 4, at 107–08.
For example, Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp determined that, out of 515 studies
addressing intergroup contact’s effect on reducing prejudice, 94% reported that “greater
contact is routinely associated with less prejudice.” See Pettigrew et al., supra note 118, at
274. But see Blasi, supra note 73, at 1247–50, 1279 (arguing that the contact hypothesis is
“wildly overoptimistic” because only under “very limited, often counterintuitive conditions” does contact with outgroup members have any positive effect on stereotyping).
See Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 268 (“[T]he mere presence of an outgroup increased
people’s tendency to categorize themselves and others in terms of group membership,
such that they assumed greater similarities between themselves and other ingroup members and perceived greater differences between themselves and outgroup members.”); see
also Bowen, Brilliant Disguise, supra note 57, at 1233–44 (observing the complexity of interactions among diverse groups of students).

800

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17:3

people tend to view members of their own “ingroup” more positively
122
than people outside their group. In these situations, individuals are
more likely to perceive similarities between themselves and other
members of their ingroup and greater differences with individuals
123
from outside their group.
This brings us back to the importance of a healthy racial minority
presence for achieving positive interracial contact. The greater the
size of the racial minority group, the more likely it is that individual
members of that group will feel the kind of institutional belonging
and trust that leads them to engage with white students. Low minority presence, on the other hand, generates a perception—both for individual minorities and their white peers—that students of color are
124
This context raises the stakes of
“representatives of their [races].”
cross-racial interactions, and—because of the attendant anxiety for
both groups—can produce “unwitting” negative, non-verbal behav125
iors, such as “decreased eye contact, greater social distance, and in126
creased fidgeting and hesitant speech.” Because individuals in both
groups fear that they are being evaluated negatively as a result of the122

123

124

125
126

Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 270. Indeed, as Michelle Adams has observed, among the
worst possible outcomes of intergroup contact is competition and conflict that locks in
the intergenerational, structural advantages that whites have over blacks in particular. See
generally Adams, supra note 1, at 1109–21 (analyzing the “process by which [blacks and
whites] compete” for economic and social advantage and the unequal “social structure”
that results from this competitive behavior).
See Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 268 (discussing studies which found that individuals in
situations where an outgroup member was present “assumed greater similarities between
themselves and other ingroup members and perceived greater differences between themselves and outgroup members”).
See Thompson & Sekaquaptewa, supra note 65, at 193 (“Research indicates that solos often feel as if they are seen as representatives of their entire group.”). Having strong
group identification can also lead people to emphasize racial salience. See Frey & Tropp,
supra note 67, at 269 (“[G]reater levels of [group] identification should lead people to
not only see themselves as group members but also expect to be seen by others in terms
of their group membership.”).
See Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 273 (describing this phenomenon).
Id. Nevertheless, “people will likely continue to be aware of differences between their
groups and expect to be perceived as group members, even when attempts are made to
reduce the salience of group membership,” though “reductions in group membership salience . . . could potentially improve metaperceptions among individual members of different groups.” Id. at 274. On the other hand, positive cross-racial interactions can have
a lasting constructive impact. For instance, a study of racial “friendship networks” observed that black students even on diverse campuses expected white students with allwhite social networks to perceive them negatively. See Daryl A. Wout et al., When Your
Friends Matter: The Effect of White Students’ Racial Friendship Networks on Meta-Perceptions and
Perceived Identity Contingencies, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1035, 1039 (2010).
However, black students expected more comfortable interactions with white students who
had racially diverse groups of friends, which, in turn, made them more likely to interact
with those white students. See id. at 1039–40.
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se unpleasant exchanges, they tend to respond by negatively judging
127
The result is a spiral of
individuals from the opposite group.
“avoidant behaviors and attitudes,” with lasting effects for individuals
128
in both racial communities as students of color and whites isolate
129
themselves from the other, leading to the very “balkanizing” effect
that equal protection condemns.
To put this in practical terms, consider what it might be like for a
handful of African-American students at a predominantly white
school. Their small numbers (combined with the limited experience
130
that most white students have interacting with blacks) makes crossracial interactions awkward and uncomfortable and, therefore, infrequent. This leads to even greater social distance between whites and
blacks on campus and further weakens black students’ social ties to
the institution. As a result of their social isolation, black students
come to view themselves as institutional outsiders and withdraw from
university life, which limits their personal development and growth.
Because they experience the university as racial “others,” they lose the
opportunity to cultivate their sense of personhood and, thus, their
individuality in a way that is more independent of their minority status.
Appreciating these group dynamics helps us to understand the
131
source of racial stigma. Opponents of affirmative action commonly
127
128

129

130

131

See Frey & Tropp, supra note 67, at 272–73 (discussing the effects of expecting to be
viewed negatively by outgroup members).
See Goff et al., supra note 67, at 91–92 (discussing the contribution of “avoidant behaviors
and attitudes” to “intergroup distancing”); Wout et al., supra note 126 at 1035–36, 1039–
40 (noting that people’s expectations that outgroup members “will perceive them negatively can have serious negative consequences,” and discussing studies demonstrating that
when black students encountered white students with racially homogenous friend groups,
those black students “expected [the] White student . . . to perceive them more negatively,” and, in turn, “expected more interpersonal challenges during the upcoming interaction with this [white] student”).
Researchers describe the “possible judgments, stereotypes, opportunities, restrictions,
and treatments that are tied to one’s social identity” as “social identity contingencies.” See
Purdie-Vaughns et al., supra note 78, at 615.
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 963 (9th Cir.
2004) (citing Brief for Respondents at 11, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02516)), reh’g granted en banc, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (noting how many students have had few interactions with individuals of other races and ethnicities prior to college); Ingraham, supra note 94 (discussing data which showed that “a
full 75 percent of whites have ‘entirely white social networks without any minority presence.’ . . . [And t]he same holds true for slightly less than two-thirds of black Americans”).
See R. A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 803, 809 (2004) (describing “racial stigma” not as “racial slurs or insults, stereotypes, or even the denial of a particular opportunity,” but as “a problem of negative social
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argue that its beneficiaries feel stigmatized by race conscious policies
and that the elimination of affirmative action would make students of
132
color more receptive to institutions that have abolished it. However,
studies point to a different conclusion—that low minority representa133
tion is a more likely source of racial stigma. For example, a study of
enrollment patterns among students of color who had been offered
admission to colleges within the University of California system following the ban on race-conscious admissions under the state constitution illustrated that higher-achieving minority students were less likely
to enroll in the more elite state institutions with low minority repre134
This finding corroborated conclusions from other studsentation.
135
ies that low minority representation signaled to admitted students
of color that they would be more isolated and less welcome, making
136
them more distrustful of the institution and less likely to enroll.
Conversely, higher minority representation at elite institutions that
were not affected by the state ban led to higher minority enroll137
Again, this comports with our understanding of the impact
ment.
of critical mass. Minority students are more likely to perceive that
they are respected by their peers and to feel institutional belonging
where they have a meaningful on-campus presence. Because they are
less visible and less tokenized, they are less likely to experience racial
138
stigma.
The lesson here is that the size of the minority presence in institutional settings matters. It cues perceptions of the environment that
in turn determine whether students of color will engage with the
broader campus community or will “bunker” in the relative safety of
139
Although size alone does not guarantee institutheir own groups.

132

133
134
135

136
137
138
139

meaning,” which “involves becoming a disfavored or dishonored individual in the eyes of
society, a kind of social outcast whose stigmatized attribute stands as a barrier to full acceptance into the wider community”).
See Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57
STAN. L. REV. 367, 369 (2004) (identifying the “costs” of affirmative action as the “stigma
and stereotypes that might result from differential admissions standards”).
See Kidder, supra note 61, at 55; Bowen, Brilliant Disguise, supra note 57.
See Kidder, supra note 61, at 84.
See Purdie-Vaughns et al., supra note 78, at 621 (discussing how low minority representation in non-educational settings, such as corporations, leads African Americans to “expect[] to be passed over for promotions, feel[] excluded from social events, and feel[]
that their race would be relevant to how others view them”).
Cf. Kidder, supra note 61, at 78–79.
Id.
Cf. id. at 69.
Id.; see, e.g., Goff, supra note 67, at 105; Purdie-Vaughns et al., supra note 78, at 615; Linda
R. Tropp et al., How Peer Norms of Inclusion and Exclusion Predict Children’s Interest in Cross-
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tional success, social science strongly indicates that it is an essential
precondition for healthy racial dynamics. However, achieving minority presence requires attention in the first instance to admitting and
enrolling students of color and then to promoting conditions for pos140
itive interactions between racial groups once they are on campus.
This necessarily depends on a degree of race-consciousness and the
use of tools that are explicitly oriented to these goals.
III. RECONCILING RACE & INDIVIDUALITY IN EQUAL PROTECTION
Part I discussed equal protection’s paradigm of colorblind individualism, which is hostile to government selection policies that distinguish individuals on the basis of race. Part II explored social science research that explains the importance of minority presence in
predominantly white institutions to the individuality of persons of
color. The absence of a critical mass of racial minorities increases the
visibility of persons of color and heightens the salience of race. It also reduces the likelihood of healthy cross-racial interactions that enable people to perceive each other in terms that move beyond racial
categories. The important point here is that the goal of achieving
critical mass is consonant with the objectives of colorblind individualism because it reduces the visibility of race and the associated harms
of tokenism, thereby promoting opportunities for the individual
growth of people of color.
This Part discusses Grutter v. Bollinger, which reconciled the tension between the use of racial classifications and individual rights
through the concept of critical mass. It then discusses the rationale
for intraracial diversity as a component of critical mass through the
lens of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.
A. Grutter, Fisher & Critical Mass
As discussed in Part I, equal protection is conventionally suspicious of distinctions based on racial groups and, therefore, presumptively rejects state interests that depend on producing certain “num141
In Grutter v. Bollinger, however, the
bers” of racial minorities.

140

141

Ethnic Friendships, 70 J. SOC. ISSUES 151 (2014) (discussing the important role of perceived
peer values for encouraging cross-ethnic friendships); Wout, supra note 126, at 1037–40.
See Bowen, supra note 53, at 386–92 (observing that “colorblindness” discourse undermines diversity benefits); Bowen, Brilliant Disguise, supra note 57, at 1233–44 (noting the
need to manage interracial dynamics in order to achieve diversity benefits).
See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978) (observing that equal protection guarantees its protections to “individuals”).
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Supreme Court reconciled the presumed tension between groups
and individuality through its endorsement of critical mass in the con142
There the Court upheld a
text of higher education admissions.
race-conscious admissions policy at the University of Michigan Law
School after concluding that it was narrowly tailored to the school’s
compelling interest in securing “the educational benefits of a diverse
143
student body.” The hallmark of the plan was its limited, holistic use
of race that was flexibly applied to ensure “truly individualized con144
sideration.”
Acknowledging the harms of low minority representation, the
Court also endorsed the law school’s individualized use of race to
produce a critical mass of persons of color. Achieving a “‘critical
mass’” of underrepresented minorities promoted the law school’s
145
educational mission by “help[ing] to break down racial stereotypes”
and diminishing the individual harms of tokenism. Enhancing the
size of racial minority groups, in other words, (paradoxically) diminishes the salience of race. As framed by Grutter, therefore, the objectives of critical mass align with the normative underpinnings of
colorblind individualism in equal protection.
The question of how to define the constitutional parameters of
critical mass with greater particularity surfaced more recently in Fisher
v. University of Texas at Austin. Fisher challenged the University of
Texas’s race-conscious undergraduate admissions policy, which
sought to build critical mass by enhancing diversity within the racial
146
minority population itself. Texas law requires the University to admit all public high school students who graduate in the top ten per147
Because significant residential segregation in
cent of their class.
the state produces racially segregated high schools, the law ensures
148
But the University detersome level of racial diversity on campus.
mined that the source of that diversity—racially segregated neighborhoods and schools—“systematically hinder[ed] [its] efforts to assemble a class that is broadly diverse, and academically excellent,
142
143
144
145
146

147
148

539 U.S. 306, 335–36 (2003).
Id. at 333.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 329–30 (citing Brief for Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539. U.S. 306 (2003)
(No. 02-241)).
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 653–54 (5th Cir. 2014) (“UT Austin persuades that . . . reach[ing] into the applicant pool is[] . . . a search for students of unique
talents and backgrounds who can enrich the [student body’s] diversity . . . .”)
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 224 (5th Cir. 2011).
Fisher, 758 F.3d at 650–51 (“The sad truth is that the Top Ten Percent Plan gains diversity
from . . .[t]he de facto segregation of schools in Texas . . . .”)
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across the board[,] including within groups of underrepresented mi149
norities.” Therefore, it supplemented the ten percent plan with an
admissions policy that allowed a student’s race to be evaluated in the
150
Importantly, race was not
context of his or her lived experiences.
necessarily a factor in the assessment of any individual applicant under
the policy; rather, its consideration depended on the relative salience
151
of race to the student’s identity or background.
Admissions data demonstrated that this individualized component
of the University’s admissions policy increased intraracial diversity
among underrepresented minority groups—specifically, that AfricanAmerican and Latino students admitted at this stage of the process
were “on average, more likely than their top 10% counterparts to
have attended an integrated high school[,] . . . less likely to be the
first in their families to attend college[,] tend[ed] to have more varied socioeconomic backgrounds; and, on average, [had] higher SAT
152
scores than their top-10% counterparts.” The University pointed to
“the great potential” these students had for “bridg[ing]” racial divides
on campus by “promoting cross-racial understanding, as well as in
breaking down racial stereotypes,” particularly stereotypes that may
153
have been reinforced by the Top 10% plan. By “increasing diversity
within diversity[,]” the University could dispel stereotypes that all racial minorities share the same backgrounds, experiences, and per154
spectives.
Thus, in fashioning its policy, the University sought to recognize
155
the individuating characteristics of students of color. But the plaintiff in Fisher argued that the ten percent plan admitted sufficient
numbers of African Americans and Latinos to satisfy the University’s
156
According to the plaintiff,
diversity-based educational objectives.
the University could not constitutionally factor race into a separate
admissions process—even in ways that were designed to acknowledge
149
150
151
152

153
154
155

156

Brief for Respondents at 33, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013) (No.
11-345) (emphasis in original).
Fisher, 631 F.3d at 228.
Id.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 149, at 33–34; see also Fisher, 758 F.3d at 653 (observing
that the Top Ten Percent Plan’s holistic review policy “was a necessary and enabling
component . . . to reach a pool of minority and non-minority students with records of
personal achievement, higher average test scores, or other unique skills”).
Brief for Respondents, supra note 149, at 34.
Id.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 654 (5th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the
University’s “holistic use of race in pursuit of diversity is not about quotas or targets, but
about its focus on individuals”).
Id. at 644–45.
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individual differences within the racial group itself as a component of
157
critical mass. The plaintiff’s contention framed the University policy through the lens of colorblind individualism—that seeking to
achieve intraracial diversity simply aggrandizes, rather than diminish158
es, the salience of race.
Fisher’s litigation position exposes yet another dimension of the
“colorblindness” paradox: the failure to acknowledge individual variation within underrepresented racial groups entrenches presump159
tions of racial “sameness” that equal protection routinely rejects.
Intraracial diversity, on the other hand, aligns with the normative
underpinnings of colorblind individualism. Drawing distinctions
among people of color promotes the individualization of their identity.
It necessarily reduces the salience of race because its whole point is
160
It
that not all persons of a particular racial background are alike.
rejects as a matter of principle the presumed “sameness” of persons
of color.
As of this writing, Fisher’s future—and the future of critical mass—
is uncertain. The Supreme Court’s decision in Fisher two terms ago
161
omitted any substantive reference to critical mass. Instead, it vacated the court of appeals judgment upholding the University of Texas
policy and remanded on the grounds that the lower court had not
162
appropriately applied a narrow tailoring analysis. On remand, the
163
court of appeals upheld the policy for a second time, setting the
164
stage for a potential return to the Supreme Court. The sections below further explore why critical mass aligns with the objectives of
colorblind individualism and why the Court should continue to embrace critical mass. As discussed below, critical mass can assume both

157
158
159
160
161
162

163
164

Id. at 644.
Id. at 645 (observing the argument by the plaintiff in Fisher that UT’s admissions policy
was “no more than an exercise in gratuitous racial engineering”).
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.B.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013).
Id. at 2415. The court of appeals initially upheld the University’s policy, but deferred to
the University’s “presumably expert academic judgment” about whether it had “attained
critical mass” or whether race-conscious efforts were still necessary to reach that objective.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 232 (5th Cir. 2011).
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 660 (5th Cir. 2014) (affirming district
court’s judgment for the University).
Daniel Fisher, Fisher vs. Texas Dismissed Again; Is It Headed Back to Supreme Court?, FORBES
(July 15, 2014, 6:19 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/07/15/fishervs-texas-dismissed-again-is-it-headed-back-to-supreme-court (suggesting Fisher’s intention
to seek Supreme Court review of court of appeals decision).
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a quantitative as well as a qualitative dimension that promotes indi165
viduality in keeping with equal protection’s normative frame.
B. Intraracial Diversity & Differentiation Norms
Below I discuss Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, which
embraced intraracial diversity explicitly in the context of higher edu166
I then
cation—both for white students and for students of color.
move on to cases outside the higher education context that focus on
norms of intraracial difference. I refer to these as “differentiation
167
norms.” Differentiation focuses on the individuating characteristics
among members of different racial groups. Bakke and the rest of these cases support the constitutional premise of intraracial diversity.
1.

Higher Education

The Court’s endorsement of intraracial diversity begins with Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke. As is well known, Bakke involved an
equal protection challenge to the admissions policy at the University
of California at Davis Medical School. UC Davis operated a two-tier
admissions track, one that was open to all applicants and a second
168
track that reserved a fixed number of seats for minority applicants.
The Court struck down the admissions policy, but in a separate opinion, Justice Powell concluded that a more refined consideration of
race, one which was designed to realize the educational benefits of
169
According to
student diversity, could pass constitutional muster.
Justice Powell, the constitutional harm of the UC Davis policy was its
170
The
quota system, rather than its consideration of race per se.
problem with the policy as designed was that it precluded white applicants from competing with the University’s racially disadvantaged
171
By setting aside a fixed number of seats for racial
applicant pool.
minorities and insulating minority applicants from holistic review,
165

166
167
168
169
170
171

Here I should be explicit that promoting individuality does not mean that race ceases to
be a part of a person’s identity—only that creating a meaningful minority presence in institutions of higher education can help liberate students of color to develop their individual identities both within and outside their racial group.
See Regents of Univ. of Cal. V. Bakke 438 U.S. 265, 316–24 (1978).
See also Carbado, supra note 18, at 1135 (discussing “differentiation”).
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 276 (1978).
Id. at 315–19.
Id. at 316–20.
Id. at 318 n.52 (“The denial [to Alan Bakke] of this right to individualized consideration
without regard to his race is the principal evil of petitioner’s special admissions program.”).

808

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17:3

race had too decisive an impact. 172 This violated a fundamental tenet
of equal protection that placed the individual at the center of its do173
main.
On the other hand, a policy that used race as a simple “plus” factor, to be weighed along with other dimensions of each applicant, was
different. As Justice Powell explained, this kind of racial consideration “treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions pro174
Justice Powell reasoned further that an applicant who is decess.”
nied admission under such a process would not have been foreclosed
from competitive consideration and, therefore, would have no consti175
Race-sensitive admissions policies faithfully adtutional grievance.
hered to equal protection’s focus on individual, as opposed to group,
176
rights.
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion formed the basis for the Court’s later decision in Grutter that an individualized, race-conscious admis177
However, an often oversions policy satisfies equal protection.
looked portion of Justice Powell’s opinion also fully ratified the
principle of intraracial diversity as a logical extension of diversity’s
178
Diversity had long been a tenet of the Hareducational benefits.
vard College admissions process that Justice Powell endorsed as a
model for constitutional consideration of race. But he noted that diversity had been limited to “students from California, New York, and
Massachusetts, city dwellers and farm boys; violinists, painters and
football players; biologists, historians and classicists; potential stockbrokers, academics and politicians,” with “few ethnic or racial minori179
ties.”
In other words, intraracial diversity among white students had
long been an institutional norm at Harvard. Admissions officers
there well recognized that a “farm boy from Idaho” could contribute
something different to Harvard College “that a Bostonian [could] not
180
offer.” Higher education had accepted the premise that admissions

172
173
174
175
176
177

178
179
180

Id. at 317–18.
Id. at 298–99.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978).
Id. at 318. See also id. at 319 (“So long as the university proceeds on an individualized,
case-by-case basis, there is no warrant for judicial interference in the academic process.”).
Id.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539. U.S. 306, 323 (2003) (“Since this Court’s splintered decision in
Bakke, Justice Powell’s opinion announcing the judgment of the Court has served as the
touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies.”).
Id. at 324.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 322.
Id. at 323.
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policies should evaluate the different experiences of white students in
determining whom to admit. Justice Powell simply sought to apply
181
the same principle to students of color.
For instance, the Harvard College admissions plan that Justice
Powell endorsed observed that “the child of a successful black physician in an academic community with promise of superior academic
performance” and a lower income black child who grew up in the inner city and demonstrated “energy and leadership” had different experiences and perspectives that could each uniquely contribute to the
182
An admissions officer could constitueducational environment.
tionally weigh these respective experiences in deciding whether to
admit either (or both) applicants. The “critical criteria,” Justice Powell noted, “are often individual qualities or experience not dependent
183
His point was that
upon race but sometimes associated with it.”
higher education can constitutionally distinguish among individuals
in ways that account for the relative salience of race to their lived experiences.
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion underscores an important point
that has been lost in the debate over race-conscious admissions policies: white students in predominantly white institutions enjoy a presumption of intraracial diversity. This is in part a function of the relative size of the white population, but is also the product of a
conscious effort by universities to embrace diversity across a broad
spectrum. As a result, white students are freer to develop their individuality without the stereotype constraints of “racial roles.” Indeed,
the number and diversity of white students in predominantly white
institutions is so extensive that we commonly fail to acknowledge
184
Both the vastness of their
whites in terms of their group status.
group—and the individual differentiation within it—diminish the sa185
Accordingly, we have come to take diversity
lience of their race.
among white students for granted. Policies like those at issue in Fisher
simply seek to extend the same benefits to students of color.

181
182
183
184

185

Id. at 324.
Id.
Id.
See Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement
of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L.REV. 953, 957 (1993) (describing whites’ general lack
of “white consciousness”); cf. Gasman, supra note 109 (discussing white student’s unique
experience attending a predominantly black college).
Id.
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2. Political Participation & K-12 Education
In contexts outside higher education, the Court has embraced
intraracial diversity as a constitutional norm by striking down raceconscious policies that obscure individual differences within minority
186
populations. In each of the cases discussed below, the Court starts
with a presumption of intraracial differentiation and rejects those
classifications that perpetuate false notions of “sameness” among individual persons of color. Because these classifications elevate racial
groups above the individual members of those groups, the Court determines that they run afoul of equal protection’s command that
“[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of
187
the laws.”
188
Shaw v. Reno offers an example of equal protection’s differentiation norms. There the Court determined that plaintiffs could bring
an equal protection claim against a state redistricting plan that appeared to effectuate a racial gerrymander by combining minority voters who resided in different parts of the state into “unusually shaped,”
189
Expressing skepticism that voters who
majority-minority districts.
were “otherwise widely separated by geographical and political
190
boundaries” shared sufficient interests to justify being grouped in
the same electoral district, the Court reasoned that the challenged
redistricting plan could only be “rationally” understood as a state ef191
The plan “reinfort “to segregate races for purposes of voting.”
force[d] the perception that members of the same racial group”
shared the same viewpoints, political interests, and would “prefer the

186

187
188
189

190
191

The anti-differentiation theory also operates, though somewhat differently, in the gender
context. It acknowledges that some stereotypes may be descriptively accurate, but are
nonetheless constitutionally problematic because they limit opportunities for nonconforming individuals within the group. Another theory of stereotypes rejects sex classifications that promote notions of “legal, social, and economic inferiority.” United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996). The Court also acknowledges stereotyping concerns
regarding state recognition of groups which it perceives as conveying assumptions of inferiority. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 464 (1985) (striking down a zoning ordinance that refused to grant a special use permit to group home
for people with mental disabilities).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
509 U.S. 630 (1993).
See also id. at 635–36 (observing that one district had been compared to a “Rorschach inkblot test” and that the second district stretched for 160 miles and wound “in snakelike
fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas ‘until it
gobble[d] in enough enclaves of black neighborhoods’” (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808
F.Supp. 461, 476–77 (E.D.N.C. 1992))).
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647.
Id. at 642.
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same candidates at the polls,” regardless of other distinguishing demographic criteria, such as “age, education, economic status,” or
192
their community of residence.
In other words, the Court’s premise in Shaw was that racial considerations in redistricting obscured differences among individual
193
voters. The Court regarded it as significant that the state legislature
failed to track the state’s political geography and instead created districts that brought together minority voters from different residential
194
The presumption was that minorities had more in
communities.
common with their own geographically-defined communities than
195
with other members of the same racial group who lived elsewhere.
The redistricting plan threatened constitutional harm because it presumed that race predominated over geography, the assumption being
that choice of residential community was a more accurate reflection
196
of individual political interests than race.
Similarly, in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, the
Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a voter initiative that
amended the State of Michigan’s constitution to prohibit race197
conscious affirmative action in higher education admissions. Plaintiffs argued that the initiative singled out race-sensitive admissions
policies for discriminatory treatment in the political process by selectively removing them, and not other kinds of admissions decisions,
198
The
from the purview of the state universities’ governing bodies.
contention was that the initiative racially distorted the state’s political
process, effectively preventing racial minorities from securing policies
that “inure[] primarily to [their] benefit” and that they “‘consider’ . .
199
The Court rejected the proposed
. to be . . . ‘in their interest.’”
standard on the grounds that it would lead to a stereotyped assess-

192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199

Id. at 647; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Texas, 548 U.S. 399, 434 (2006)
(noting the importance of intraracial differentiation in the redistricting context).
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 658.
Id. at 647.
For a critique of Shaw v. Reno, see Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty:
Jurisdictional Formation and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1997).
See Guinier, supra note 1, at 1603 (discussing the view that “geography approximates political interests”).
Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623 (2014).
Respondents’ Brief on the Merits at 1–5, Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (No.12-682).
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634 (citing Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 472
(1982)). Justice Sotomayor echoed this point in her dissent. See id. at 1651, 134 S.Ct. at
1651 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Yet to know the history of our Nation is to understand
its long and lamentable record of stymieing the right of racial minorities to participate in
the political process.”).
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ment of the kinds of policies that “benefited” racial minorities.200
This was untenable because it presumed that racial minority groups
shared similar, readily discernible interests and, therefore, failed to
201
acknowledge the individuality of racial minorities.
202
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1
offers another example of equal protection’s differentiation norms.
There the Court struck down school district policies that used racial
classifications to achieve racial balance and diversity among the en203
The Court rejected the policies on narrow tailorrolled students.
204
A crucial problem was the broad dimensions of the
ing grounds.
racial classifications themselves, which, in the case of one district,
identified students as being “white” or “non-white” and, in the se205
cond, classified them as “black or ‘other.’” In a district that included widely diverse student populations, the Court determined that
these rough categorizations failed to capture the full spectrum of
206
Its premise—that race had been too
students’ racial identities
bluntly utilized to align with each district’s diversity goals—suggests
that more finely grained racial definitions could better satisfy their
207
educational objectives. The recognition of people of color as individuals, rather than as members of a racial group, depended on embracing the full spectrum of racial diversity, rather than relying on
rough racial distinctions of “non-white” and “other.”
As each of these cases indicates, the Court has struck down raceconscious policies that obscure differences among individual members of minority groups. These cases support the constitutional
premise of intraracial diversity, which by definition emphasizes the
individuality of persons of color.
200

201
202
203
204
205
206
207

Id. at 1634 (Kennedy, J.) (“In cautioning against ‘impermissible racial stereotypes,’ this
Court has rejected the assumption that ‘members of the same racial group—regardless of
their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live—think alike,
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.’”
(quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993))).
Id.
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
Id. at 709–11.
The Court did not reach the question of whether diversity itself is a compelling state interest in the context of K-12 education. Id. at 726.
Id. at 727.
Id.
Id. at 723–24 (“Even when it comes to race, the plans here employ only a limited notion
of diversity, viewing race exclusively in white/nonwhite terms in Seattle and black/‘other’
terms in Jefferson County.” (citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610
(1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)). See also Metro Broadcasting, Inc., 497 U.S. at 610 (“We
are a Nation not of black and white alone, but one teeming with divergent communities
knitted together by various traditions and carried forth, above all, by individuals.”).
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C. Racial Recognition & Identity
The previous subparts discussed differentiation norms in equal
protection. Drawing on these cases, I have suggested that public universities may constitutionally take differences among individual
members of racial minority groups into account in their admissions
policies. But these cases also raise a separate problem with the plaintiff’s theory in Fisher. Prohibiting the consideration of race as a supplemental, individualized component of critical mass requires the
state to disregard the role that race may have played in shaping the
lives of applicants. In the name of protecting individuality, “colorblindness” paradoxically commands the state to overlook an im208
Inportant element of an applicant’s identity and personhood.
deed, the University of Texas admissions policy was calibrated for this
purpose. It allows race to be factored into the overall assessment of
the candidate if it is demonstrably meaningful to her lived experi209
ence.
Thus, barring racial considerations in higher education admissions—effectively erasing race—threatens to undermine individuality
210
Efforts to
in a way that tramples core equal protection concerns.
erase race—to pretend that it does not exist under the guise of
“colorblindness”—can actually undermine the full expression of per211
sonhood. Requiring the state to ignore race in a context in which it
is individually meaningful denies persons of color the opportunity to
explore in their application racially-associated experiences that com212
Allowing the state to
prise an important element of their identity.
pursue diversity, but not diversity within underrepresented racial
groups, sends the message that individuality matters for white stu213
dents but not for racial minorities.

208
209

210

211
212
213

Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1676 (2014) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (noting the “stark reality that race matters”).
See Joint Appendix at 168a–70a, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (No. 11345), available at http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Joint%20Appendix.pdf
(reproducing a segment of a deposition, in which the deponent explained contextualized
consideration of race).
See Carbado & Harris, supra note 48, at 1147–48 (contending that “colorblind admissions
regimes” are “likely to be particularly costly to applicants for whom race is a central part
of their social experience and sense of identity”).
Id.
Id.
See supra Part III.B.1 (identifying a hidden presumption of intraracial diversity for white
students).
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IV. LESSONS FOR EQUAL PROTECTION
Equal protection has long embraced a rubric of “colorblind” indi214
vidualism, which presumes that state recognition of racial groups
215
Social scileads to racial stereotyping, stigma and balkanization.
ence reveals that these assumptions are not only mistaken but, paradoxically, can produce the very racial dynamics that equal protection
216
Contrary to the assumptions of “colorblindness,”
condemns.
217
groups and individual identity are linked. As discussed earlier, enhancing the size of a minority group in an institution can create posi218
tive racial synergies that improve the health of the institution itself.
Enlarging the size of the minority presence also fosters the individual
development of persons of color by alleviating the salience of race in
219
This
ways that free racial minorities to explore their individuality.
in turn creates conditions that lessen racial stigma, stereotyping, and
220
the social harms of tokenism. Further, contrary to assumptions that
racial classifications lead to group balkanization, critical mass increases the opportunity for healthy cross-racial interactions that build
respect, mutuality, and reciprocity between persons from different
221
racial backgrounds.
The lesson here, therefore, is that for equal protection to be faithful to its professed goals of individualism, it should continue to permit racial classifications that foster diverse institutional settings
through critical mass. By bolstering the depth and breadth of racial
diversity, institutions enhance the opportunity for positive intergroup
contact and for ameliorating racial stereotypes that retard individual
222
Creating such an environment,
opportunity and development.
however, necessarily requires explicit attention to building a healthy
group presence of racial minorities and attending to the conditions
214
215

216
217
218
219
220
221
222

See supra Part I.
See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (observing that
“classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm”); id. at 494
(“[P]referential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain
groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based on a factor having
no relation to individual worth.” (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
298 (1978))); see also Siegel, supra note 29, at 1278 (identifying an “antibalkanization perspective” on equal protection that condemns uses of race perceived to “threat[en] social
cohesion”).
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
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of that setting, which in turn requires explicit attention to race it223
This raises important questions about how to operationalize
self.
critical mass and—more particularly in light of Fisher—how to pursue
critical mass through intraracial diversity. I turn to this last point
now.
224
225
Devon Carbado and Vinay Harpalani, who both support the
constitutional premise of intraracial diversity, have explored questions about its implementation, though they differ in some of the
particulars in important respects. Harpalani, for example, proposes a
“unique contribution to diversity” test, which would require universities to identify how their race-conscious selection policies improve the
representation of certain minority groups and/or enhance diversity
226
within those groups, such as by increasing the “socioeconomic, cul227
tural, or geographic diversity among Black and Latino students.”
This is a sensible approach, though I would not require universities to
demonstrate that they have in fact achieved “sufficient diversity of
viewpoints . . . within each racial group,” as Harpalani at times ap228
pears to suggest. In my view, universities need only show that their
policies seek to admit students of color with a range of different experiences and that these policies are narrowly tailored to their goals.
For example, a university might conclude that an African-American
student who attended an inner city high school brings a different experience than a student who graduated from a predominantly white
high school in the suburbs. Depending on the profile of the students
who have already been admitted, a university might properly con-

223

224
225
226
227
228

See, e.g., Purdie-Vaughns et al., supra note 78, at 621–22 (discussing how “colorblind” policies increase the perception of social threat in corporate institutions with low minority
representation).
See Carbado, supra note 18, at 1164.
See Harpalani, supra note 18, at 477 (observing that “within-group variation actualizes the
educational benefits of diversity, as it serves to break down racial stereotypes . . . .”).
Id. at 524–25.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 494; see also id. at 470 (urging universities “to demonstrate explicitly that [their]
race-conscious policy is used to increase the variety of viewpoints and experiences among
minority students—by admitting minority students in different majors, or from different
cultural or socioeconomic backgrounds . . . .”); id. at 473 (defining critical mass to “refer[] to the diversity of viewpoints and experiences within racial groups”). One potential
problem with requiring a showing of viewpoint diversity is that viewpoint testing runs perilously close to trenching on First Amendment concerns. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377 (1992) (describing the constitutional impermissibility of viewpoint testing under
the First Amendment).
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clude that one adds to intraracial diversity more than the other. In
229
fact, Justice Powell endorsed such an approach in Bakke.
Carbado properly cautions against adopting a framework that may
incentivize admissions officers to judge applicants of color according
to how well they conform (or don’t conform) to stereotypical charac230
teristics and behaviors most associated with their race. This means
that universities should avoid devising admissions systems that “trade
231
on biases and stereotypes.” To return to my earlier example of the
African-American students who attended two different kinds of
schools, admissions officers under my formulation could constitutionally take their different experiences into account in evaluating
their applications. But it would cross the line to make admissions decisions based, for example, on whether a particular student is more
(or less) “authentically black.” The constitutional problem here is
that such a judgment rests on racial stereotypes about how blacks
“are” or are “supposed” to be: it confines the universe of “blackness”
to people who conform to a predetermined set of characteristics or
behaviors and rejects (or accepts) those based on whether they deviate from the identified racial archetype. No such problem occurs,
however, where an admissions officer decides to admit an AfricanAmerican student based on the uniqueness of her experiences or
background. This judgment, of course, involves some assessment of
why she is different, which in turn depends on some understanding of
commonalities among African Americans as a group. But it survives
constitutional review because it does not depend on rigid, mechanistic assumptions about African Americans in general. Rather, it is
based on an acknowledgement of individual differences among the
racial group: it opens the universe of “blackness” by acknowledging
that black people can be and are, in relevant respects, different—not
only from those who are not black, but also from each other.
In his dissent from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ recent majority opinion in Fisher, Judge Garza missed this point, contending
that the University of Texas’s policy to promote intraracial diversity
229
230

231

Indeed, this is the approach that Justice Powell endorsed in Bakke. See Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 321–24 (1978).
See Carbado, supra note 18, at 1135, 1158 (asking whether decisionmaking processes that
promote intraracial diversity are “normatively desirable” and contending that an “intragroup differentiation dynamic” in the admissions context can lead to judgments about
whether African Americans are “stereotypically black”); cf. DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU
GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING RACE IN “POST-RACIAL” AMERICA 1–2 (2013) (exploring how employees manage and “perform” racial identity to conform to and to disconfirm racial stereotypes).
See Carbado, supra note 18, at 1158.
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itself depended on racial stereotypes. 232 Garza argued that minority
students admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law were regarded by
the University as “somehow more homogenous, less dynamic, and
more undesirably stereotypical than those admitted under holistic re233
This argument, however, tracks the misguided premise of
view.”
colorblind individualism, which ignores once again the reality and
relevance of the lived experiences of race. There are two responses
to the Fisher dissent, both of which justify the University’s approach.
The first is that the educational environment of segregated schools is
different than the environment of integrated schools, not invariably
worse, but most certainly different in key respects. Indeed, it is so
fundamentally different that we have erected an entire body of con234
The second response,
stitutional doctrine around the distinction.
which is consistent with the first, is that minority students who attend
racially segregated schools may very well have experiences that are
similar to minority students who attend integrated schools and vice
versa. Indeed, as already discussed, learning about such shared experiences is an important part of the university experience. But of
course these students will never have the opportunity to realize their
commonality unless the university brings them together in the first
place. And once it does, these students might well come to appreciate their shared individuality within the broader context of society’s
racial architecture.
This leaves us with the constitutional question of how to determine when critical mass has been achieved and race-conscious admis235
sions are no longer needed. Given the vagaries of human nature, it
is impossible to engineer human relationships completely. This
means that an institution likely would have a hard time determining
the size of the minority population that is required to achieve critical
236
Rather, it would have to evalumass without some trial and error.
ate and monitor the quantity and quality of diverse interactions on
campus, in addition to creating social structures that facilitate such

232
233
234
235
236

758 F.3d 633, 669–70 (Garza, J., dissenting).
Id.
See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237
(1991); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Carbado, supra note 18 (discussing constitutional questions associated with “critical
mass”); Harpalani, supra note 18 (discussing the same).
Cf. Harpalani, supra note 18, at 484 (observing that the “educational benefits of diversity . . . may vary based on local history, demographics, and politics, or the institution’s history and educational mission, all of which can also change over time”).
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interactions. 237 Through careful observation, a university might determine that a certain range of racial minority students is more likely
238
to achieve a critical mass in its particular environment, though that
range may change over time with demographic shifts and changes in
the profile of the institution’s student population. Once the number
239
of students falls within this range, the university might cease to consider race in admissions for that cycle. Importantly, this does not
mean that it would necessarily cease to admit minority students; it
would only limit the number of students who could be admitted un240
der a race-conscious process for purposes of achieving critical mass.
Properly conceived and implemented, therefore, critical mass can
take account of relevant differences within underrepresented minority groups, but not in a way that depends on racial typecasting. Once
again, the goal is to permit institutions to acknowledge race as part of
an individual’s identity, if the applicant’s life experiences and circumstances so indicate. The objective is to create an environment
that both recognizes and cultivates the individuality of persons of
color, just as it does for white students. Failure to do otherwise is inconsistent with equal protection’s normative framework.
CONCLUSION
Equal protection advances principles of colorblind individualism,
but social science points to race as a lived reality. Although the state
may ignore race, it cannot make race go away; and doing so, in fact, is
likely to make race relations worse. Given these outcomes, colorblind
state action is never fully “race neutral” and colorblindness may in
fact be color-consequential. Social science reliably indicates that increasing the size of the minority population in an institution can
ameliorate the effects of tokenism, stereotypes, and stigma. Therefore, the use of racial classifications to build a healthy minority presence paradoxically diminishes the salience of race. It promotes the
individuality of persons of color and, accordingly, is more consonant
with the objectives of equal protection.
237
238

239
240

See Bowen, Brilliant Disguise, supra note 57, at 1234–44 (noting the importance of carefully
managing interactions among a diverse groups of students).
See Adeno Addis, The Concept of Critical Mass in Legal Discourse, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 97,
133–34 (2007) (observing that the creation of “critical mass” depends on empirical observation of the student body and their interactions in a unique institutional context).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336 (2003) (observing that “a range is inconsistent
with a quota”).
See id. at 342 (observing that narrow tailoring requires periodic review to determine continued necessity of race-conscious selection process).

